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Evolution Paradigms and Constitutional Rights: The Imminent Danger 
of Artificial Intelligence 
 
Benjamin S. Herrick 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In forty years, humans will be obsolete; cast aside, like the tools man used in ancient 
times.  The face of society will be forever changed.  For the first time in history, a species will 
author its own evolution, man1 will become one with machines, and after that, when the new 
“man” realizes that his organic parts are holding him back, the man will disappear from the 
machine forever.  Technology has been driving our society since man began thinking.  We have 
always used tools, or machines, to help us with tasks or projects that we either could not do,2 or 
merely chose not to do,3 without such aid.  The machines have grown increasingly complex over 
the years, and man’s dependence on machines has also increased tremendously, even 
exponentially, in recent times.  There may even be a time in the near future when one will not be 
able to distinguish between man and machine. 
 An equally likely situation would involve man’s triumph over technology such that the 
machines mimic the man more so than any science fiction writer could ever have dreamed.  Our 
society has been thinking about this problem since the advent of machines, and, during World 
War II, with the advent of the relay computer by Mr. Alan Turing, man’s dream of creating 
intelligent “life” has become more and more plausible.  Some scientists even believe that the 
 
1 Throughout this paper, I may refer to human beings in the aggregate as simply “man.”  I mean no disrespect and 
do not leave women out of the equation.   
2 Have you ever tried to catch a fish with your hands? 
3 Have you ever calculated the area underneath a curve without at least a pen and paper? 
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technology that would create artificial intelligence is nearly upon us.4  Scientists, philosophers, 
theologians and mathematicians alike have been debating this for years, but now even legal 
scholars are joining the debate.5 
 Does the idea that within one or two generations, the new dominant species on the planet 
will be “born” sound too far-fetched?  Does the thought that this is possible evoke fear into our 
collective hearts and minds?  If so, should it?  Could this be utopia, or would the situation more 
likely arise that man and artificial intelligence would be at war, as is the case in virtually every 
motion picture about the subject.6 
 This paper will discuss the problems that might arise with the technology of the future.  If 
man creates a sentient machine, then how should the law treat this machine?  Would it be 
property?  Would it be able to claim constitutional rights?  Part I of this article will argue that not 
only is artificial intelligence possible, but that it is inevitable and imminent; it will also discuss 
current technological breakthroughs and speculate about the implications of the advent of 
artificial intelligence.  Part II will discuss consciousness in humankind, and will argue that 
machines will become conscious, sentient creatures.  Part III will discuss notions of society and 
societal values, and the history of legal personhood under the United States Constitution.  
Finally, Part IV will provide a framework within which we should work to enter the new age, 
 
4 See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 103-
06 (1999); HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 59-64 (1999).  Using the same basic 
framework, both authors predict that artificial intelligence will exceed the capacity humans have around the year 
2040. 
5 See Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 659 (1991); Lawrence B. Solum, Essay: Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 
(1992). 
6 See, e.g. THE TERMINATOR (Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer 1984); TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (Metro-Goldwyn-
Meyer 1991), THE MATRIX (Warner Brothers 1999); BLADE RUNNER (Allan Ladd 1982).  In the most recent film 
addressing artificial intelligence, filmmaker Steven Spielberg portrayed a world where humans tortured and brutally 
“murdered” artificial intelligences for excitement, until an AI was in the form of a child, and cried out for his life.  
See A.I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Warner Brothers 2001).  See infra, part II.C for the importance of films on this 
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where the advent of artificial intelligence will force us to rethink the roles that man and machine 
play in society. 
 Before we get into the heart of the matter, however, I would like to discuss one issue that 
threatens any discussion of artificial intelligence: God.  How can we reconcile the idea that God 
created life when we, the creation, are about to create our own form of life?  Are we really 
playing God?  Is this process evil?  The answer is no.  We’re not playing God; we are not even 
creating life.  We are simply creating a more sophisticated machine that will be able to process 
information better than we can.  Whether this leads to the destruction of “life” as we know it 
remains to be seen, but if it does, then it will be the result of a process already occurring in 
nature, evolution; a process that, as I will discuss in Part I, has been working towards this end 
since the beginning of mankind.  God may have created the Universe, and thus created life, but it 
was evolution that created intelligence, and intelligence that will forever work to better itself.7 
I. ENTERING THE NEW ERA: THE ROOTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 The possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) is a subject upon which man has speculated 
for centuries, but it is only now where the debate has taken on new meaning, as the scientists 
responsible for such technology are on the verge of a breakthrough.  We must prepare ourselves 
for the inevitability that AIs will eventually become the dominant species on the planet.  This 
section will articulate some current breakthroughs in technology and discuss the logic behind the 
possibility of AI. 
A. The Beginning Debate Over AI 
 The debate over whether it is possible to create intelligence and consciousness without 
biology is not new, and neither are the arguments for and against this proposition.  The 
 
subject, as an indicator of pop culture. 
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fundamental premise behind the plausibility of AI is that the human brain works on a mass 
system of computations.8  If this is true, then any system that equals the computational capacity 
of the human brain will be able to function in the same manner.  This point is not easily 
conceded, however, what we think of our experiences cannot easily be attributed to mere 
computation.  When we react to our surroundings, by either viewing, hearing, smelling, touching 
or tasting them, it does not seem natural to think that what we are doing is simply performing 
math computations and algorithms.  All we seem to do is witness; we hear a siren, we feel the 
keyboard, we taste an orange, we smell flowers.  Further, it seems to happen so instantaneously 
that we don’t think to ourselves that there could be a delay between the input and the registration 
of the input (between our seeing and hearing a something in the air and recognizing it as a crow).  
Further, if this theory of computations holds true, then where does that leave us?  The mystery of 
mankind will disappear, which will fundamentally alter the way we think about religion, law and 
everything else around us.  The paradigm of mystery will be no more.9  This is not a concept 
people accept easily. 
 The most prolific argument against the possibility of AI comes in the form of the 
“missing something” argument.10  Proponents of this view will welcome the mystery that makes 
up mankind and argue that humans possess something (let’s call it a spirit) that cannot be 
replicated, and that any simulation of human thought processes will lack this spirit, and will 
never become human, thus will never become intelligent, sentient creatures.11  A second 
argument contends that humans lack the thought capability to comprehend our own existence, 
 
7 For a significant implication involving artificial intelligence and the end of the universe, see infra, note ___. 
8 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 73 (describing what makes up intelligence); Solum, supra note 5, at 1231. 
9 See DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 21-26 (1991). 
10 See Solum, supra note 5, at 1262-76. 
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and therefore, cannot replicate it in anything else.  This second view is akin to giving up; this 
argument would just accept everything we see and feel and do and not contemplate the origins.  
However, for our society to progress in any meaningful manner, this view simply cannot stand.  
This is the view that rejects all of science’s attempts to explain the great mysteries; the stars, the 
earth, and the origin of species, and now, the human mind. 
 This debate will continue throughout this article, especially as I explore paradigms of 
consciousness.12  Consciousness is the most important aspect of this debate, however, because of 
its implications on society and culture, and the subsequently, on the law.  However, with 
Kurzweil’s Law of Time and Chaos, this debate may end up being a fruitless venture. 
B. Evolution and Kurzweil’s Law of Time and Chaos 
 Kurzweil draws upon the nature of time and the laws of thermodynamics to propose the 
Law of Time and Chaos.13  He proposes first that the true nature of time is not linear, but rather 
speeds up and slows down during certain salient events.14  In the beginning of the universe, for 
example, more events pertinent to the process of the universe’s creation happened in the first 
billionth of a second, and after that, each new salient event took billions of years to develop.15  
This illustrates that time, relative to the creation of the universe, has been slowing down since the 
universe’s inception.  On the other hand, with respect to evolution, time has been speeding up 
exponentially.16  Where the first living creature took billions of years to develop, the next stages 
of development happened in increasingly smaller increments, first millions of years, then 
 
11 See id.; see also MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 73-4.  The “something” to which I refer has been called 
consciousness, the soul, feelings, etc. 
12 See infra, part II. 
13 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 10-33. 
14 See id. at 10-11.  A salient event is one that is pertinent to any process. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. at 12-14. 
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hundreds of thousands of years, now tens of thousands of years.17  Thus, time either speeds up or 
slows down exponentially, and over the course of the universe only seems to move linearly.18 
 The next key question asks just what it is that triggers time’s speed up or slow down.  
This is where Kurzweil turns to the laws of thermodynamics.19  The second law of 
thermodynamics holds that disorder, or entropy, increases in a closed system over time.20  This 
disorder, or randomness, when measured against a process, is called chaos.21  The opposite of 
chaos for our purposes is order, but does not simply refer to the opposite of disorder.22  Order 
here means “information that fits a purpose,”23 and resembles the ordinary definition of 
complexity.24 
 From the second law of thermodynamics, Kurzweil states “The Law of Time and Chaos: 
In a process, the time interval between salient events (that is, events that change the nature of the 
process, or significantly affect the future of the process) expands or contracts along with the 
amount of chaos.”25  Thus, as order increases, the time interval between events decreases.  This 
fits well into evolution, where at first, there was no order, and it took a long time for life to 
 
17 See id. at 13-14. 
18 This also implicates Einstein’s theory of relativity, where time can be felt differently by different entities 
according to the speed at which they travel.  See id. at 11. 
19 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 12. 
20 See id.  This is called the Law of Increasing Entropy.  A closed system is one that is not affected by outside 
influences, such as the universe.  See id.  We assume (it’s the only assumption required) that nothing outside of the 
universe exists to exert any influence upon it. 
21 See id. at 29.  Kurzweil further explains chaos: 
We have to be careful here in our definition of chaos.  It refers to the quantity of disordered (that 
is, random) events that are relevant to the process.  If we’re dealing with the random movement of 
atoms and molecules in a gas or liquid, then heat is an appropriate measure.  If we’re dealing with 
the process of evolution of life-forms, then chaos represents the unpredictable events encountered 
by organisms, and the random mutations that are introduced in the genetic code. 
Id. 
22 See id. at 30. 
23 KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 30. 
24 See id. at 31. 
25 Id. at 29. 
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evolve, but as life evolved, the order increased, and the entry of more and more complex life-
forms took less and less time.  Conversely, in the beginning of the universe, a lot happened in the 
first billionth of a second, when there was little chaos, and ever since then, it has taken more and 
more time to change the universe significantly.  This leads logically to two sub-laws.  First, 
Kurzweil notes, is “The Law of Increasing Chaos:  As chaos exponentially increases, time 
exponentially slows down (that is, the time interval between salient events grows longer as time 
passes).”26  However, the opposite of the Law of Increasing Chaos is also implied from the Law 
of Time and Chaos.  Kurzweil calls this “The Law of Accelerating Returns: As order 
exponentially increases, time exponentially speeds up (that is, the time interval between salient 
events grows shorter as time passes).”27  Thus, relevant to the universe (chaos expanding 
exponentially), it takes longer and longer for the process to change significantly, but, relevant to 
evolution (order increasing exponentially), the time between salient events decreases, and 
evolution goes faster and faster as time progresses.28 
 The Law of Accelerating Returns has proven true not only in terms of the evolution of 
life, but also in the field of computer technology.  Since the U.S. Census in 1890, the number of 
calculations per second available in machines has been increasing exponentially, according to 
Moore’s Law.29  Gordon Moore helped invent the integrated circuit and observed the exponential 
growth of computing technology first in 1965.30  Several scientists have since noted that the 
trend did not begin in the 1960’s, but instead began with the birth of computing in the early 
 
26 Id.  Recall the Second Law of Thermodynamics, that entropy increases in a system over time. 
27 Id. 
28 The amount of order it takes to create intelligent life is insignificant to the entropy in the entire universe, thus, 
order can increase in evolution and chaos can increase in the universe at the same time.  See id.  at 12. 
29 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 20-25. 
30 See id. at 20. 
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1900s.31  At first, the computational processing speed doubled every three years.32  That pace has 
since quickened, and now computer processing doubles every twelve months.33  Again, as order 
has increased, relative to computer processing technology, time intervals between salient events 
(doubling computational capacity) has been decreasing.34 
 So far we’ve seen that the Law of Accelerating Returns fits into evolution and computer 
technology, but how do the two tie into each other?  Again, the premise that the human brain 
works as a computational machine is key.  If that premise is true, then evolution will dictate that 
humans should let their biological computers (their brains) go and attach themselves to their non-
biological computers (the computer chips of tomorrow).  This will allow humans to evolve, 
whereas if they had remained attached to their biological computers, then the growth potential of 
the brain would be far less; whereas the Law of Accelerating Returns holds that the growth 
potential will always increase exponentially.  This leads us logically to the next question: have 
scientists been attempting to combine organic parts with their non-organic counter-parts? 
 Scientists have successfully combined biology, the living, with technology, the future of 
life, to create a new organism.35  Researchers at Northwestern University built a machine guided 
by the brain of a lamprey.36  They extract the brain of a lamprey and connect it to a special 
robotic computer system, capable of movement, which keeps the brain alive for a short time.37  
 
31 See id. at 25; MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 60-61. 
32 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 25. 
33 See id. 
34 Remarkably, since 1890, the price at which you may purchase the new processors has remained constant, and still 
does.  See id. at 24; MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 60.  This means that the price of the newest chip will always be the 
same as the price of the last newest chip. 
35 See Ben Macintyre, First Cyborg is Looking Just a Little Down at Eel, THE TIMES, April 18, 2001, available at 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,3-116291,00.html 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
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The lamprey’s search for food commands the robot to which it is attached.38  This is the first 
cyborg, a successful combination of living tissue and technology, and the implications are 
astounding.  Using electrical impulses stemming from the brain of a living organism to control 
mechanical parts directly through the nervous system of the creature to which it is attached will 
set the stage for the elimination of biological parts altogether.  Evolution and the Law of 
Accelerating Returns dictate that first biology will combine with technology and second that 
technology will eventually leave biology behind. 
II. HUMANS AS CONSCIOUS MACHINES 
 How does the human brain work?  Does it function like a machine, using a mass of 
computations, or is there something else to it?  That is the focus of the next section of this article.  
I will argue that it is because the human brain works like a machine that allows human beings to 
be conscious, sentient creatures.  I will also discuss the arguments to the contrary, and hopefully, 
provide a better understanding of the nature of the debate over AI in terms of consciousness. 
 A legal scholar writing about the possibility of machines possessing consciousness 
argued that since, to our collective knowledge, only organic brains have previously exhibited 
conscious activity, then that should lead to a presumption against consciousness in machines.39  
Another discussed the prominent objectors to AIs possessing consciousness and pointed out that 
those objections left open the possibility for machines to become conscious in the future.40  
Computer scientists, on the other hand, decide to set this question aside, and conclude:  
The machines will convince us that they are conscious, that they have their own 
agenda worthy of our respect.  We will come to believe that they are conscious 
much as we believe that of each other . . . . They will embody human qualities and 
 
38 See id. 
39 See Solum, supra note 5, at 1265. 
40 See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 673-80 (discussing John Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument and Roger Penrose’s 
arguments against algorithmic computers possessing consciousness). 
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will claim to be human.  And we’ll believe them.41 
 
Another scientist describes how part of our subjective experience that makes up consciousness 
might be programmed into a machine.42  Moravec describes “pain” to a machine as the 
“sensation . . . associated with dire emergencies that need immediate attention.”43  In this case, if 
the machine sensed something that could destroy it or damage it, sensors would trigger a 
program that would defend itself, by using negative conditioning.44   This would have the 
appearance of something akin to fleeing, calling for help, or perhaps even attempting to scare 
away the negative influence.45  After the situation is averted, then the machine might “reflect” on 
the situation, sort of replay it in its mind, examining the causes and effects.46  It would then 
associate these causes with negative, or bad effects, and decide that, next time, it would not be 
prudent to act in the way that caused it to have such a negative reaction.47 
 Thinkers have been struggling with consciousness, the subjective experience, for 
centuries, and for a long time, Descartes’s idea of dualism held the predominant view.48  Dualism 
holds that the mind, what we think of when we say “I,” is a different entity from the body and 
brain.49  Let’s call this the spirit.  The spirit ultimately controls the body, it interacts with the 
body, responding to stimuli that are gathered by the body.50  The spirit receives signals from the 
body, gathers them and views them in what is called the “Cartesian Theater,” with the audience 
 
41 KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 63. 
42 See MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 123. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id.  This seems very similar to a child learning, by experience, that touching a hot stove is not a good idea. 
48 See, e.g., KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 60; MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 121; DENNET, supra note 9, at 33-42; 
Goldberg, supra note 5, at 677-79. 
49 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 33. 
50 See id. at 34-35. 
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of the theater being the spirit.51  Once the spirit views all the inputs, it can then “direct traffic” 
and react to them.  When we think, to ourselves, about how we think, act and feel, this seems 
logical.  We don’t consider that the body and the mind are one, we say things like, “This is my 
hand.”  This is a perfectly natural thing to say, but it implies that the hand is something different 
than the possessor of the hand.  We consider the brain to be the organ that processes all 
information, but we wouldn’t say something like “My brain owns this hand,” we simply say 
“This is my hand.”  Similarly, we think of our “self” as possessing our brains in much the same 
fashion as the rest of our bodies.52  So it is easy, and natural, to acquiesce in Dualism, because 
we consciously believe that we are different from our brains.  However, as appealing as this 
sounds, it is complete fantasy: 
The brain is Headquarters, the place where the ultimate observer is, but there is no 
reason to believe that the brain itself has any deeper headquarters, any inner 
sanctum, arrival at which is the necessary or sufficient condition for conscious 
experience.  In short, there is no observer inside the brain.53  
 
As we discuss this fantasy, we will find out just how difficult it is to posit a theory of 
consciousness that eliminates the idea of Dualism, but that is just what I intend to do.  After we 
shed our ideas of Dualism, we can then make progress to figure out what it is that makes a “self,” 
how we get one, and how we can program one into a machine. 
A. Dennett’s “Multiple Drafts” Theory of Consciousness 
 We have already gotten a look at the first premise of Dennett’s theory, the idea that 
Dualism, in all of it’s forms, is to be completely set aside.  He posits that there is no single point 
 
51 See id. at 104-07. 
52 You do have a brain, don’t you? 
53 DENNETT, supra note 9, at 106. 
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that marks the line between conscious and unconscious activity.54  Instead, Dennett suggests that 
consciousness exists as a series of perceptions, elaborations and interpretations existing in 
parallel throughout the brain.55  Whereas Dualism would hold that the perceptions and 
interpretations would be collected by the body and sent to the spirit for view, the Multiple Drafts 
model suggests that since there is no spirit that physically exists anywhere, once the perception, 
interpretation and elaboration of an input takes place by its proper sensor, consciousness is 
achieved throughout.56  Since we do not yet know what it is exactly that we mean when we say 
the word consciousness, for now, a good definition would be a narrative sequence.  We 
remember things happening (conscious experiences) as though they are a story, for if we were to 
ask ourselves afterward “What happened?” then we would give ourselves an answer in the form 
of a story.  Examining the phenomenon of phi and subsequent stories can illustrate and 
substantiate the premise that there is no single identifiable point in time at which we are aware 
and before which we were unaware.57 
 Phi is, put simply, apparent motion; we have used this idea to create something that 
appears to be moving out of pictures depicting motion showed in rapid succession.58  Dennett 
uses an example of phi whereby the experimenter will flash, in rapid succession, two different 
colored circles59 which he separates by at least four degrees.60  The subject experiences the dot 
moving from left to right, with the color of the dot changing from red to green about halfway in 
 
54 See id. at 111 (“We must stop thinking of the brain as if it had such a single functional summit or central point.”) 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 113. 
57 See id. at 114.  Phi works especially well here because Dualism cannot explain is. 
58 See id.  This is the premise behind motion pictures, television, and animation.  See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 114.  
In an animated broadcast, there is no motion, even on film, but it looks like the characters are moving.  For a 
practical example, when watching the Simpsons, you seem to see Homer Simpson choke his son Bart, but Homer 
and Bart actually only exist as a series of lines drawn on a page. 
59 The left circle is red, the right circle is green. 
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between the two locations.61  The subject sees apparent motion.  But how does the subject 
experience the motion of the two dots (and the color change at the midpoint) before the 
experimenter shows the second dot?62  Something must create this illusion, but for the Dualists, 
this creates a conundrum, for if the brain waited until all the inputs were gathered at the 
Cartesian Theater, then it would be too late to interpose the motion and color-switching 
phenomenon.63  Instead of movement and color switching, you would experience the stationary 
red dot, then the stationary green dot; this is not what happens.  Moreover, the effects of the 
phenomenon (color switching and movement) seem to precede their causes, because we seem to 
see the dot moving and switching colors before the second dot even appears.  So what happens?  
How does your brain play tricks on you? 
 There must be some sort of revision, some edited version of events that gets passed from 
your sensors, in this case eyes, to your memory, or conscious experience.  This revision can take 
one of two forms.  The first is dubbed an Orwellian revision.64  In an Orwellian revision, the 
brain would corrupt the memory just after the experience, so that anytime (even immediately) 
after the experience, you would only remember the edited version.65  The second revision theory 
is called Stalinesque revision, and would literally happen before the experience.66  Something 
would corrupt the “signal,” between the sensor and the brain, to implant a bogus memory.67 
 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 115. 
64 See id. at 115-17.  This is named after George Orwell’s book, 1984, wherein the Ministry of Truth would literally 
rewrite history so that nobody would be able to see the real truth.  See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 116. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 117.  Stalin would literally hold false trials to corrupt history, rather than rewriting history once it 
happens.  See id.  That is to say, before you are conscious of the experience; before the information is processed.  
See id. at 118-19. 
67 See id. 
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 Using these two theories to explain phi, we would say that, under the Orwellian revision 
theory, the brain received the signals of the two stationary dots, and for whatever reason rewrote 
“history” to account for the apparent motion, so that reflecting on the conscious experience 
would lead the subject to conclude that the red dot turned green halfway through.  On the other 
hand, under the Stalinesque revision theory, something would corrupt the signal of the red 
stationary dot and the green stationary dot on the way to the brain, so that any introspection 
would yield the exact same, yet erroneous, conscious experience. 
 If we were to think of the apparent motion phenomenon like film or television, then the 
brain would have to “fill in” the intervening frames, between the stationary first spot and the 
stationary second spot.68  But we still have yet to answer the question of how that can happen 
before the second dot appears.69  The Stalinesque theory of revision would have some sort of 
time delay built into it, so that the “signal” could be corrupted before you were conscious of the 
event.70  On the other hand, the Orwellian revision theory would allow both signals to enter into 
consciousness and thereafter initiate the cover-up, so that the observer would see the motion 
notwithstanding the lack thereof.71  What difference is there, if any, between these two theories?  
We can state the difference, see above, but is that a real difference? 
[Both models] account for the verbal reports: One theory says they are innocently 
mistaken, while the other says they are accurate reports of experienced mistakes.  
Moreover, we can suppose, both theorists have exactly the same theory of what 
happens in your brain; they agree about just where and when in the brain the 
mistaken content enters the causal pathways; they just disagree about whether that 
location is to be deemed pre-experiential or post-experiential.  They give the same 
account of the nonverbal effects, with one slight difference: One says they are the 
result of unconsciously discriminated contents, while the other says they are the 
 
68 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 118-19. 
69 See id. at 120. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 121. 
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result of consciously discriminated but forgotten contents.  Finally, they both 
account for the subjective data -- whatever is obtainable from the first-person 
perspective -- because they even agree about how it ought to “feel” to subjects: 
Subjects should be unable to tell the difference between misbegotten experiences 
and immediately misremembered experiences.72 
 
The point of all of this speculation about experiences and revision theory illustrates the simple 
truth, that there is no point in the brain distinguishing the conscious from the unconscious.73  
Any point we choose would be arbitrary; if it is arbitrary, then we’ve simply made it up.  If 
we’ve made it up, then it doesn’t exist.74 
B. The Problem of Thought Generation 
 The theory works well with situations in which our conscious experiences are merely 
reactions to stimuli, but how can it account for thought (and speech) production?  There has to be 
a starting point, even if there is no end point; in which case, couldn’t the starting point be 
considered the “Central Meaner”?75  Before we can consider answering this question, we must 
first consider the broader question of the origins of consciousness. 
 1. The Origin of Consciousness 
 Dennett proposes that three factors have come together to produce what we now think of 
as consciousness.76  We are already familiar with the first factor, genetic evolution.  This is the 
process by which certain gene traits are passed down through generations according to the laws 
 
72 Id. at 124-25. 
73 See id. at 126. 
74 Dennett calls this the “Multiple Drafts” theory by drawing an analogy to the publishing of papers.  See DENNETT, 
supra note 9, at 125.  There is an arbitrary date, the date of “publication,” before which the revisions are content-
based, after which the revisions are merely to edit for typographical errors.  See id.  But the paper does exist before 
publication, multiple drafts of it are sent out to readers for critique, yet we do not consider it a paper until after the 
arbitrary date of publication.  See id. 
75 See id. at 227-28. 
76 See id. at 208.  These three factors are 1) genetic evolution, 2) plasticity in the brain, and 3) memetic evolution.  
See id.  Writing before Kurzweil’s Law of Time and Chaos, he points out that each of these factors has shown up in 
history at increasing rates of speed.  See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 208. 
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of natural selection.77  The second factor, plasticity, requires a little bit more attention.  Plasticity 
in the brain is a capacity for learning.78  When nature has not given one individual brain the gene 
traits necessary for survival and reproduction, the individual may overcome this by way of 
learning how to cope with one’s surroundings during one’s own lifetime.79  We see this plasticity 
in creatures other than human beings; animals will learn to do things, you can teach a dog how to 
do tricks.  So plasticity should be described more as adaptation and memory. 
 Finally, the remaining factor is memetic evolution.  Memes are simply ideas, but ideas 
which spread through humanity by the same process as genes, by natural selection.80  The 
“good” memes, as with the “good” genes, are those that can spread quickly and replicate.81  To 
do this, a meme will require a host, and then an avenue to reach other hosts, and so on.  There are 
several hosts; books, pamphlets and papers can all hold ideas, and can be spread quickly by the 
use of a photocopier or printer.  These hosts are temporary, though, and for immortality, memes 
must somehow get into the ultimate host, a brain.82 
 We already know why genetic evolution and plasticity are important; they have literally 
built our brains, but Dennett’s theory goes one step further, because he contends that memetic 
evolution (or cultural evolution) can shape the brain as much as its memory and original 
structure can.83  Just like the operating system on which your computer runs can shape the way it 
processes information, so too can your ideas about self, society, right and wrong shape the way 
 
77 See id. at 184-86. 
78 See id. at 182. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 200-02.  The origin of the word is French, for memory, and Greek, for imitation, but should sound like 
the word for gene.  See id. at 202. 
81 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 203. 
82 See id. at 205. 
83 See id. at 209-10. 
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you process information.84  For example, the meme for education is a particularly good meme; it 
not only implants itself into almost every human being, but it also requires more memes to be 
implanted, thus triggering exponential growth for memes in the brain.85  The speed with which 
memes can be transmitted throughout culture allows for even the weakest, in terms of natural 
selection, among us to equal the strongest by allowing them to “catch up.”86 
 As I mentioned earlier, these three factors set the stage for the “advent” of consciousness.  
However, we still do not have a very good working definition of what consciousness is; when 
disproving the “goal-line” in the brain theory, our working definition was our narrative 
sequence, our memory of experiences, or how we related experiences to others.87  This definition 
does not fit all purposes, however, and needs to be revised. 
 Consciousness is not a thing that one either has or does not have.  It is more of a 
spectrum, every living thing (and some that are not living) possess a certain degree of 
consciousness, but for most creatures, the only use for consciousness is to distinguish itself from 
the rest of the world, so we say that they are not sentient creatures.88  But humans, on the other 
hand, are aware of “self,” have reflected upon it, and have related their experiences to others in a 
meaningful way.  Even though other, less complex organisms have some sense of “me,” which is 
defined in relation to “the world that is not me,” they do not possess the reflection and relation 
requirements that separate human consciousness from the mere idea of “self.”  Thus we have a 
better definition of consciousness, but we still do not know what is a “self.” 
 2. Virtual Machines and the Self 
 
84 See id. at 207.  Memes and genes form a symbiotic relationship in the brain; genes provide an environment, 
memes may contribute to “remarkable design-enhancements” which may trigger better genes.  Id. at 208. 
85 See id. at 207. 
86 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 208. 
87 See supra, page 12. 
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 In 1936, we changed the face of computational technology forever.89  In this year, the 
Allies cracked the Nazi code, using the Universal Turing Machine, invented by Alan Turing, 
with later modifications made by John von Neumann.90  Turing came up with the philosophical 
idea behind the machine, which would emulate how a human would go about solving 
mathematical equations.91  The early machines worked in serial, which basically means that it 
can handle one function at a time.92  Early computers working in serial could not compute very 
many functions per second, and with only one function at a time, it literally took as long for the 
early machines to solve geometric equations as it did for high school students.93  However, as 
computations per second increased,94 so too did the number of functions per second.  Thus, even 
when performing only one function at a time, currently, computers can handle millions of 
functions per second.95   
 Scientists were able, however, despite the slow speed of early computing, to construct 
virtual machines onto the physical machines capable of processing.96  A virtual machine is one 
that is “made of rules rather than wires.”97  This is what we commonly think of as software.  
Software recognizes inputs, right now that would be keystrokes, because I am using a word 
processing program, and, with the program’s rules, will perform certain functions once those 
inputs are done.  Here, if I press a key, the symbol marked on the key will show up on the screen 
 
88 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 447-48. 
89 See MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 20; see also KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 73; DENNETT, supra note 9, at 211. 
90 See MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 20; DENNETT, supra note 9, at 211. 
91 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 212.  To do this, Turing would ask himself, what is the first step to solving this 
problem? then what is the next? and so on.  See id. at 212. 
92 See id. at 213. 
93 See MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 21. 
94 See supra, pages 7-9. 
95 See MORAVEC, supra note 4, at 60-61; KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 24. 
96 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 211-13. 
97 Id. at 211. 
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and subsequently print onto a sheet of paper.  The plasticity of computing machines now, that is 
its memory, can store a multitude of information, such as this entire paper, many other papers, 
and the rules that make up several other virtual machines that I use on a daily basis.98  Thus, even 
the early computers, such as the Universal Turing Machine, could emulate any physical machine, 
and two of the three key factors that make up human consciousness already exist in the machines 
of today.99  The only remaining step is to prove that the human brain is a machine; if that 
happens, then, using the concepts of the Universal Turing Machine, we can emulate perfectly the 
human brain, and this would necessarily include human consciousness.100 
 The human brain is not a serial machine, with one function being performed at a time, but 
is rather a massively parallel machine, which performs many functions at a time.101  The 
connections in the human brain are not electric, like those of computers that we build, but are 
instead neurological.102  These neurons are capable of calculations, albeit at a much slower rate 
than their electric counterparts.103  There are two factors, however, that more than make up for 
the brain’s speed deficiency.  First, we have an extremely large amount of neurons, about 100 
billion.104  What’s more, they are acting in concert, or in parallel, which means that they are all 
connected to each other.105  Kurzweil estimates that, on the average, each neuron has about 1000 
connections.106  If we do the math, then we come out with an estimate of calculations per second 
 
98 See id. 
99 Recall that these were genetic evolution (producing computational capacity in the brain), plasticity (memory) and 
memetic evolution (cultural ideas spreading throughout). 
100 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 217. 
101 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 102-03; DENNETT, supra note 9, at 217. 
102 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 103. 
103 See id.  While computer chips can perform millions of calculations per second, the neuron is limited to only 200.  
See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See id; see also DENNETT, supra note 9, at 217. 
106 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 103. 
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in the human brain of 20 million billion.107  So then a virtual machine working in serial could 
emulate a massively parallel physical machine, but only if the requisite amount of calculations 
per second existed, but does it necessarily follow that the reverse is true?  Can a parallel physical 
machine emulate a virtual serial machine?  The answer to this is the crux of Dennett’s theory of 
consciousness: “Conscious human minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines implemented . 
. . on the parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us.”108 
 This premise, while seemingly preposterous, provided the basis of modern day 
computing technology.109  That is to say that Turing, when formulating the philosophical 
premises of computing machines, used his own stream of consciousness as a guide, by breaking 
up problem solving into a series of simple steps.110  Further, assuming, arguendo, that this is 
true, then the roots of Dualism also appear.  The distinction between the mind and the brain 
would make a lot of sense, it would seem, if the mind was a program running on the hardware of 
the body, like Microsoft Windows is to your PC.  We know the place from which Microsoft’s 
Windows gets its rules, the programmer, and it is easy to load the program into the machine.  
Finding out the human “code,” however, is not as easy, but can be described as “a highly 
replicated meme complex.”111  Our ideas, combined with the ideas that we receive from others, 
have created the “software” that is our consciousness. 
 Thought and speech generation come from the consciousness, but as we just discussed, 
 
107 See id.  This is a 2 followed by fifteen 0s.  Kurzweil offers that his estimate is “conservatively high,” but not by 
more than three orders of magnitude.  See id.  This may seem to be a figure that is too astronomical to ever be able 
to duplicate, in terms of functions per second, but recall that the Law of Accelerating Returns dictates exponential 
growth in computing technology.  See supra, pages 7-8.  At the current rates of growth for computational 
technology, the calculations per second in electric-based computing machines should equal human brains by the 
year 2020.  See supra, note 4 and accompanying text. 
108 DENNETT, supra note 9, at 218. 
109 See supra, note 91 and accompanying text. 
110 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 212. 
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this could mean merely that several different processing units evolved memes, and by virtue of 
the laws of natural selection, our conscious experience only “remembers” the ones that get 
“published.”  Thus, even though a “Central Meaner” seems to exist by necessity, in order to form 
intentionality, this may not be the case, it may just be an evolutionary fight for the best 
replicating idea to come forward and get published into the conscious experience.  The 
implications of this theory are tremendous for AI researchers; this provides the philosophical 
(and mechanical) framework that allows for human consciousness to be literally programmed 
into a machine built by human hands. 
C. Rebuilding Humans 
 The previous pages illustrate that, in theory, the conscious mind can be transposed onto a 
physical machine, however, AI research encompasses more than just the conscious mind, and 
legal theorists that have studied this area have concluded that the context within which a machine 
would assert rights in society may be just as important as the “inner workings” of the machine.112  
That is to say, even though a machine might actually be a conscious, sentient creature, if it can’t 
convince other humans of this fact, then it will be a tough row to hoe to convince a judge to grant 
that machine rights as members of society.  This illustrates the importance of robotics research 
and materials engineering to the machines of the future, for I suspect that humans would be more 
apt to accept consciousness in another creature if it looked, sounded and acted like another 
human being. 
 Turing, in 1950, proposed a test to determine whether a machine has reached human 
 
111 Id. at 221. 
112 See Solum, supra note 5, at 1282-83. 
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intelligence.113  This test would require a human judge, asking a series of questions to two 
participants, one being a machine and the other a human.114  The object, for the participants, 
would be to convince the judge that it was the human.115  If the human judge cannot determine 
which participant is man and which is machine, then Turing proposes this to be the recognition 
of an Artificially Intelligent creature.116  Since any question is fair game, the computer would 
have to have a vast “knowledge” of the human experience in order to compete with the 
human.117 
 John Searle has objected to this test in what has been called the “Chinese Room.”118  
Searle proposes that if a human were in a form of the Turing test, but the test was administered in 
Chinese, instead of English.119  You are given a rule book, which tells you to write down certain 
characters, in Chinese, whenever you see a set of other characters.120  As long as you have 
followed the rules, and written down the Chinese properly, then the judge would have to be 
convinced that you understand Chinese, even though you in fact do not.121  More generally, 
Searle is arguing that simulation of intelligence is not enough to show actual intelligence. 
 A myriad of rebuttal arguments have met this argument, most of which focus on the 
intelligence of the entire process; rather than on the individual players writing down meaningless 
 
113 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 61-63; DENNETT, supra note 9, at 435-39; Solum, supra note 5, at 1235-38. 
114 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 61-63; DENNETT, supra note 9, at 435-39; Solum, supra note 5, at 1235-38; 
Goldberg, supra note 5, at 673-80. 
115 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 61-63; DENNETT, supra note 9, at 435-39; Solum, supra note 5, at 1235-38; 
Goldberg, supra note 5, at 673-80. 
116 See KURZWEIL, supra note 4, at 61-63; DENNETT, supra note 9, at 435-39; Solum, supra note 5, at 1235-38; 
Goldberg, supra note 5, at 673-80. 
117 On the other hand, the questions should be such that they would not “stump” the human, for it would be an easy, 
albeit shallow, victory if the judge declared that the computer was the winner because the human replied that he “did 
not know.” 
118 See Solum, supra note 5, at 1237-38; Goldberg, supra note 5, at 673-80. 
119 See Solum, supra note 5, at 1237. 
120 See id. 
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(to them) Chinese characters.122  This argument holds that Searle is just restating Dualism, 
because a series of computations by themselves, without some spirit to guide them, can never be 
considered conscious.123  Another rebuttal argument would have one consider the evidence that 
we have regarding the consciousness of other human beings.124  We really only have 
circumstantial evidence that other humans are conscious, these are the outward signs such as 
facial expressions, tears, laughter, and pain symptoms.  So if something else could emulate this, 
and look like a human in doing it, then why would we require more evidence of its consciousness 
than that of our neighbors or colleagues? 
 In the science fiction classic Blade Runner, Harrison Ford’s character performed a 
modified Turing test, to determine if the “Replicants” were indeed machines.125  He would ask 
several questions of the machine, and test for an “emotional” response by magnifying the 
replicant’s eye.126  If no emotional responses were present, then he would determine that the 
replicant was in fact a machine.127  Similarly, on an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, 
the AI known as Lieutenant Commander Data attempted to resign from Starfleet rather than 
submit to an invasive procedure that could have “killed” him.128  In the trial, the judge conducted 
her form of the Turing test in open court and declared that Data was not property of Starfleet.129 
 Pop culture, including television, radio, and especially the motion picture industry, can 
account tremendously for the way we, as a society, feel about a certain issue.  Movies can be 
 
121 See id. 
122 See DENNETT, supra note 9, at 437-38. 
123 See id; see also Goldberg, supra note 5, at 677-78. 
124 See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 676. 
125 See BLADE RUNNER, supra note 6. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See Star Trek: The Next Generation: The Measure of a Man (Fox television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1989). 
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great meme implantation devices, subjecting millions of viewers to the ideas of the filmmaker.  If 
movies of the near future portray AIs in a positive light, rather than as the enemy of mankind, 
then it is very possible that human beings, when AI becomes a reality, will not consider it a great 
leap in logic to grant rights to AIs, because they would have already gotten used to this idea. 
 Two factors could be integral influences in the debate over AI rights.  The first would be 
how accustomed to this idea our society becomes.  The media could play a very big role in this 
meme’s development.  The second factor would be the AI’s likeness to human beings.  For I 
suspect that the Turing test will be modified so that the judge will be able to see the participants 
while the test is going on because if we see a “person,” acting like a human being, claiming to be 
a human being, then we will assume, as we assume now, that they are self aware and conscious, 
regardless of whether they are hiding their true identity as a robot. 
 This point illustrates the importance of the robotics industry.  Scientists are working very 
diligently to create, or “rebuild” human beings using mechanical parts.130  Even one function of 
human existence, the eye, has taken scientists decades to replicate.131  Despite this difficulty, 
scientists have done it; they can now build the parts necessary to “see” and interpret enough 
information to be able to operate a motor vehicle safely.132  In 1995, the NAVLAB computer used 
a minivan, powered by a laptop computer, to drive itself, for 98.2% of the trip, from Washington, 
D.C. to San Diego, California, at average speeds of over sixty miles per hour.133 
 Since scientists are well on their way to replicating the human experience in a machine, 
 
129 See id. 
130 See, e.g., Laura Lorek, Mechanized Assistants Are Becoming More Lifelike, MSN Computing Central (May 4, 
2001), at http://msn.zdnet.com/msn/zdnet/story/0,12461,2714212-hud00025ab,00.html. 
131 See MORAVEC, supra note 9, at 26-49 (describing the process by which he and others invented a car that drove 
itself). 
132 See id. at 44. 
133 See id. at 45. 
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the next question we need to answer asks what does it really take to get rights as a member of 
society?  Does our constitution differentiate between humans and non-human entities?  Has this 
always been the case?  If a machine were to pass the Turing test, as modified, would that creature 
ever be able to assert rights as a “person” in this country?  The next section of this article 
discusses Legal Personhood and the intellectual framework of the United States Constitution. 
III. LEGAL PERSONHOOD AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION  
 Before addressing the Constitution of the United States of America as it pertains to 
persons, I would like to review the discussion thus far.  First, the Law of Time and Chaos 
dictates that processes like evolution, which rely on order, increase their pace exponentially.  
This also means that the time between major evolution paradigm shifts shortens.  For the last half 
million years or so, homo sapiens have enjoyed the pleasure of being the dominant species on the 
planet.  Our first evolution paradigm, based on DNA, has yielded this result.  However, the Law 
of Time and Chaos holds that a paradigm shift will take place, because DNA based evolution 
cannot keep up with the exponential pace of computational technology. 
 Second, I have discussed a theory of human consciousness which provides the 
philosophical underpinnings that would allow for this paradigm shift.  If consciousness can be 
emulated perfectly by a mechanical computer, and this mechanical computer has the potential for 
exponential growth, then humans will have created an intelligence more intelligent that 
themselves.  This will mean that humankind will no longer be the dominant species on the 
planet, and the second paradigm in evolution will be upon us.134 
 
134 I would like to take this time briefly to discuss a little bit more on the subject of God; specifically, the soul.  If it 
is true that human consciousness, the “Central Meaner,” can be duplicated without “life,” then will these new 
machines have souls?  Will this technological advancement reject God?  The answer is no.  Since Darwin’s theory 
of evolution, and recent discoveries in the genome project, it seems clear that homo sapiens were only created 
indirectly.  That is to say that God created the process that created human life.  If evolution has any basis in fact, and 
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 Next, I will discuss the ideas associated with personhood under the Constitution.  
Scholars have written volumes about the issue of legal personhood.135  While most have differing 
theories as to what exactly it takes to become a legal person, one commentator has concluded 
that “the theories of personhood used by the Court are merely post hoc rationalizations 
supporting purely pragmatic decisions.”136  While this may seem true at the outset, the Court has 
established an overriding theory, which is consistent with the theory of the Constitution itself, 
that one may use to determine whether an entity may assert rights under the Constitution: 
meaningful membership in society.  This does not require that one be physically human to 
qualify, nor does merely being human automatically qualify one for personhood status.  If one is 
a meaningful member of society, then one is granted personhood status.  To fully understand this 
requirement, one must examine first the text of the Constitution itself, including the preamble, 
and second the jurisprudence surrounding certain Amendments with respect to both human 
beings and corporations. 
A. The Text of the Constitution 
 The text of the Constitution frequently uses the word “person” or the aggregate “people.”  
 
if a soul truly exists, then either everything has a soul, or nothing has a soul.  If human beings did not come directly 
from God, and if human beings can possess souls, then a soul is not something that is unique to humankind.  On the 
other hand, it is at least possible that nothing has a soul, and that the meme of the soul only exists because human 
beings are comfortable with the idea of Dualism, where the soul acts as the “Central Observer.” 
 Regardless of whether AIs will possess souls or not, this is not relevant to the overall question of whether 
we should grant machines rights under the Constitution.  See Solum, supra note 5, at 1274.  The soul is not a 
requisite possession before one can attain the status of a “person” under the Constitution. 
135 See, e.g., Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 
577 (1990)(arguing that we should amend the Constitution to eliminate corporations from its protections); Sanford 
A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563 (1987)(discussing 
corporations and personhood in the context of language); Lee Hall and Anthony John Waters, From Property to 
Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1 (2000)(arguing that great apes should be granted 
personhood status); Natasha N. Aljalian, Note, Fourteenth Amendment Personhood: Fact or Fiction?, 73 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 495 (1999)(comparing corporate personhood with that of the fetus); Harvard Law Review, Note, What We 
Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745 
(2001)(arguing that the theory of personhood merits more attention than that which it receives). 
136 Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of 
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First, the Preamble to the United States Constitution opens with “[w]e the people of the United 
States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”137  Second, 
individual liberties, found in the Bill of Rights, may be prefaced in one of two ways.  Individual 
liberties may be limits placed upon government action regardless of against whom the 
government may act,138 or could take the form of specifying who may assert the liberty interest 
against possible government action.139  Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment states that “nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”140  Some rights, such as the 
freedom of speech, may therefore be asserted by anyone, living or not, because they exist as 
purely a limit on government action.  For most individual liberties, however, one must be a 
“person” before one may assert this right against the government.141 
 Any confusion in the subject of personhood comes about because the Constitution 
nowhere defines the term “person,” and as such this has been the subject of much debate, both by 
commentators and Supreme Court Justices.142  Further, our idea of the Constitutional person 
changes with time.  When the Constitution was first ratified, there is no question that both 
African-Americans and women were not on the same legal level as males who owned 
 
Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1451 (1992). 
137 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
138 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . .”). 
139 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . .”). 
140 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (emphasis added). 
141 This is especially true when one considers the incorporation doctrine.  Even though the First Amendment applies 
to the several states, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, by its face, is limited to 
“persons.”  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
142 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83-90 (1938)(Black, J., dissenting)(arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment should not apply to corporations because it was intended to protect human beings only); 
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822-28 (1978)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(arguing that since 
corporations are created by statute, then as such only those rights designated in the statute and those incidental 
thereto should be afforded to corporations). 
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property.143  If we take the view that membership in society equals Constitutional person, then 
this allows for the flexibility inherent in society; we may change the definition from time to time 
to accommodate those who should be included. 
B. Human Beings and the Fourth Amendment 
 When is a human being denied “personhood” status?144  When can the Government act 
without respecting the Constitution?  In the wake of the September 11th tragedy, the 
Government has set up a “detainee” camp in Guantanamo Bay, a U.S. controlled military 
complex in Cuba.145  They have held these “detainees” without Constitutional protection for 
quite some time now, disregarding several key rights that the Government would have to address 
if these “detainees” were American citizens acting in this country.  The Supreme Court has 
established precedent for these actions, and has excluded adult human beings from Constitutional 
protection when the Government acts abroad.146 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for five other Justices and excluded from “personhood” 
status a Mexican who had never been to the United States until Mexican officials, acting at the 
behest of U.S. Marshals, apprehended the defendant and brought him to the United States.147  
After U.S. officials arrested Verdugo-Urquidez, agents of the Federal Government searched 
Verdugo-Urquidez’s home in Mexico without a warrant.148  Verdugo-Urquidez moved to 
suppress evidence obtained from his home in Mexico based on the grounds that the government 
 
143 See Harvard Law Review, supra note 135, at 1747-48. 
144 I will leave for another day the discussion of when a fetus is indeed a person.  For the purposes of this article, I 
will only deal with adult human beings who have been denied “personhood” status. 
145 See  Barbara Starr & Bob Franken, Taliban Detainee Thought to be American Coming to U.S., Apr. 4, 2002, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/04/04/ret.american.taliban/index.html. 
146 See U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
147 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262. 
148 See id.  The Drug Enforcement Agency, through its agents acting in Mexico, actually performed the search after 
Mexican authorities granted them permission to do so.  See id. 
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conducted the search without a warrant, in contradiction to the Fourth Amendment.149  The 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment, which would normally prohibit searches of this 
nature, did not apply to government action against Verdugo-Urquidez.150 
 The Court first distinguished between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, because the 
Fifth Amendment would be available to Vergudo-Urquidez, as it is available to all criminal 
defendants.151  However, opined Rehnquist, the text of the Constitution’s preamble and the 
Fourth Amendment itself suggest that only “people” could assert Fourth Amendment rights.152  
Rehnquist defines “the People,” as it relates to the Fourth Amendment as “refer[ring] to a class 
of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”153  Further, the legislative 
history available regarding the Fourth Amendment intimated that “it was never suggested that 
the [Fourth Amendment] was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against 
aliens outside of the United States territory.”154  Thus, even though Verdugo-Urquidez was 
human, he was not a “person” under the Constitution, and the Government could act in complete 
derogation of the Constitution when it acted outside of the United States territory, as long as the 
defendant had not established a “sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of 
[this] community.” 
 Verdugo-Urquidez also reinforces the theory of the Constitution, that the Sovereign has 
first created the U.S. Government by adopting the Constitution, and second has restricted the 
 
149 See id. at 263. 
150 See id. at 261.  The Drug Enforcement Agency believed Verdugo-Urquidez to be involved with a large Narcotics 
operation in Mexico responsible for the “kidnapping and torture-murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena 
Salazar.”  Id. at 262. 
151 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264. 
152 See id. at 265. 
153 Id. 
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Government’s power to that which is expressly designated in the Constitution.155  The Sovereign, 
of course, is the People, which Rehnquist has determined “refers to a class of persons who are 
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this 
country to be considered part of that community.”156 
 It could be argued that Verdugo-Urquidez could simply stand for the proposition that the 
U.S. Constitution has territorial limitations, i.e., the United States, and therefore, the Constitution 
cannot be used abroad, because its jurisdiction ends with the boundaries of the United States.  If 
that is true, then it would destroy the premise that meaningful membership in this society equates 
to legal personhood under the Constitution.  However, the Supreme Court has held that the U.S. 
Constitution does apply overseas, in situations in which the persons asserting rights against the 
government fit into the definition given by Rehnquist in Verdugo-Urquidez.157 
 In Reid, a plurality of the Court held expressly that when the United States acts against its 
own citizens abroad, it must follow procedural limitations placed upon it by the Constitution.158  
There, the wives of servicemen abroad were subject to military proceedings when they were put 
on trial for killing their husbands.159  Although these women were not military personnel, they 
were subject to court-martial, rather than civilian criminal court.160  The Court emphatically held 
that when the U.S. government acts against its own citizens, even though they are not physically 
in the country, then the Constitution requires the government to act in accordance with the rights 
that protect U.S. citizens.  Therefore, the premise that meaningful membership in U.S. society is 
 
154 Id. at 266. 
155 See id. at 270 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957)). 
156 Id. at 265 (emphasis added). 
157 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. at 3. 
160 See id. 
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more important to the issue of Constitutional rights than territorial limitations and boundaries. 
 We learn another lesson from Verdugo-Urquidez, that any entity who has the ability to 
assert certain rights against the Government, i.e. the Fourth Amendment,161 must necessarily be a 
“person” under the Constitution, otherwise they, like Vergugo-Urquidez, would not be able to 
assert these rights.  Therefore, if a corporation is able to assert Fourth Amendment rights to limit 
government action, they too must be a “person” under the Constitution.  The next section of the 
article addresses this subject. 
C. Corporations and the Bill of Rights 
 As scholars have indicated, the Court has used several theories to apply the Bill of Rights 
to corporations.162  The Supreme Court has struggled with each of these theories, and has yet to 
unanimously agree on which theory to use when deciding these issues.163  Originally, the Court 
employed the “creature” theory, which held that since corporations are creatures of statute, the 
only rights they receive are those that the statute grants them.164  However, this theory lead to 
troubling results, so the Court employed a second theory, the group theory.165  This group theory 
held that since corporations were comprised of human beings, the corporation could assert any 
rights that the individual members, as persons, could assert.166  Finally, the Court has articulated 
that corporations do have some sort of “personhood” status that exists independently of its 
 
161 Parts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment can be included in this category, 
by virtue of the Constitution’s text.  See supra Part III.A. 
162 See Schane, supra note 135, at 564; see also Mayer, supra note 135, at 580-81. 
163 See Mayer, supra note 135, at 620-21. 
164 See Schane, supra note 135, at 565-66.  This seems very similar to Reid’s determination regarding the status of 
the U.S. Government, which only exists by virtue of its statutory power found in the Constitution.  See Reid, 354 
U.S. at 5-6.  In both situations, acting outside of the authority specifically granted to it would constitute an ultra 
vires action.  See Schane, supra note 135, at 566. 
165 See id. 
166 See id.  This theory rests on the individual’s freedom of association.  See id. 
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individual members and of its legislative status.167  Scholars call this the “natural entity” or 
“person” theory, and it rests on the premise that a “group is more than just an expression of the 
sum of its members.  It acquires common will and pursues its own goals, and its life continues 
regardless of changes in membership.”168  Interestingly, as judicial regulation has changed over 
time, the different theories that the Court has imposed seem to blend into the regulatory schemes 
very well.169 
 However, the Court has recently been deciding cases based not on the nature of the 
corporation, but on the nature of the rights that it intends to assert.170  Thus, even though there 
have been, historically, several philosophical ways of dealing with corporate personhood, the 
Court has found that the Constitution plays a more important role in “personhood” than anything 
else. 
 1. The Fourth Amendment 
 Relative to human beings, Fourth Amendment protections are only available to those 
class of persons who are part of the national community.171  Thus, if corporations were able to 
assert Fourth Amendment rights against the Government, then, by definition, they would also be 
in the class of persons who are part of the national community.  They would be “persons” under 
the Constitution.  The Court has been consistent in declaring that corporations may in fact assert 
Fourth Amendment rights against the Government.172 
 First, the Court decided whether the Fourth Amendment would bar a prosecution where 
 
167 See id. at 566-67. 
168 Id. at 567. 
169 See Mayer, supra note 135, at 582-83; see also Schane, supra note 135, at 568-69. 
170 See Mayer, supra note 135, at 629. 
171 See supra, part III.B. 
172 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977); 
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
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an owner or manager did not allow inspectors to inspect his commercial premises without a 
warrant or probable cause to believe that a code violation had occurred.173  The Court, in See, 
specifically explained that “[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a 
constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his 
private commercial property.”174  Further, the Court held, when records and books of a business 
are subpoenaed, they must be “sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in 
directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.”175 
 In See, the City of Seattle prosecuted the defendant under a city fire code when he did not 
allow inspectors to enter his warehouse without a warrant.176  The Washington courts upheld the 
conviction, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.177  The Court did note, however, that 
businesses, especially those pervasively regulated by the government, should expect to submit to 
more inspections than the private homeowner,178 but the Court held firm that the Fourth 
Amendment did protect businesses as well as individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.179 
 Later, the Court affirmed this ruling in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States.180  There, 
the United States charged George Norman with “aiding and abetting a misapplication of funds 
from a federally insured bank.”181  Norman disappeared before being taken into custody still 
 
173 See See, 387 U.S. at 541-42. 
174 Id. at 543. 
175 Id. at 544. 
176 See id. at 541. 
177 See id. at 542, 546. 
178 See id. at 545-46. 
179 See See, 387 U.S. at 546.  Justice Clark dissented.  However, the crux of the dissent focused on whether the 
search was reasonable, and not on whether the business should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.  See id. at 
547-48 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
180 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977). 
181 G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 340. 
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owing several hundred thousand dollars to the Internal Revenue Service for income taxes.182  
The government attempted to employ certain “self-help” devices and repossess property of 
Norman’s business, the G.M. Leasing Corporation, which owned substantial assets.183  
Specifically, the government seized several luxury automobiles owned by the corporation but 
which were not on corporation property along with books, furnishings, and records from inside a 
“cottage” owned by the corporation.184 
 The Court held that the government’s seizure of the automobiles did not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment, since this took place “on public streets, parking lots, or other open places, 
and did not involve any invasion of privacy.”185  However, since the government entered the 
business premises to obtain the books and records, this action did implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, and since the government acted without a warrant, the action was 
unconstitutional.186  The Court noted that certain businesses, i.e. a gun dealership, were more 
pervasively regulated, and thus had to expect more intrusions on their property than other 
businesses and individuals.187  However, in this case, the Court found “no justification for 
treating petitioner differently in these circumstances simply because it is a corporation.”188  
Therefore, the Court affirmed its rule from See that affords businesses Fourth Amendment 
protection from government action.189 
 
182 See id. at 341. 
183 See id. at 341-42. 
184 See id. at 344-46. 
185 Id. at 351. 
186 See id. at 352-53. 
187 See G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 353-54. 
188 Id. at 354. 
189 See id. at 358. 
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 Finally, the Court in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States190 held that aerial photography 
of a business without a warrant did not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.191  The Court decided this case not on the grounds that businesses are not entitled 
to Fourth Amendment protection, but on the grounds that “open areas of an industrial plant 
complex with numerous plant structures spread over an area of 2,000 acres are not analogous to 
the ‘curtilage’ of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance.”192 
 In Dow Chemical, the plaintiff kept tight security over its 2,000-acre industrial plant in 
Midland, Michigan by prohibiting public views from the ground and investigating any low-level 
air flights to determine whether photographs of the plant were taken.193  The Environmental 
Protection Agency, upon receiving consent by Dow Chemical, inspected certain power plants on 
the complex.194  After Dow Chemical refused a second inspection, the EPA took aerial 
photographs using a “standard floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping camera.”195  Dow 
Chemical subsequently became aware of this action and brought suit, claiming that the EPA 
conducted a “search” without a warrant.196 
 The Court did find that Dow Chemical had a reasonable and objective expectation of 
privacy that society was clearly prepared to observe, and that Dow Chemical was not required to 
“erect a huge cover over a 2,000-acre tract” to protect its plant from aerial view.197  Despite these 
findings, however, the Court held that since the complex resembled the “open fields doctrine” 
 
190 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
191 See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239. 
192 Id. 
193 See id. at 229. 
194 See id. 
195 Id. 
196 See id. at 230. 
197 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 236. 
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rather than the “curtilage” doctrine, then the government’s action was not a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, especially since no physical entry onto the premises 
occurred.198 
 These Fourth Amendment cases consistently illustrate the fact that corporations are 
entitled to basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.  In the context 
of human beings, the Court has held that this particular constitutional provision does not apply to 
those persons who are not part of the national community or those who have such ties as to deem 
them part of the national community.199  The simple fact remains, however, that corporations are 
“persons” under the constitution because they are part of the national community.   
 There is no doubt that corporations participate meaningfully in society; they account for 
most of the jobs and are a large force in the economy.200  As participants in society, the Court has 
deemed them to be part of the sovereign, part of “the People” to which the Constitution refers.  
“The People,” as the sovereign, come together to create the government and at the same time 
protect themselves against unreasonable governmental action by adopting the Constitution.  
Every participant in society is deemed to be “the People,” and thus can claim the protections of 
the Constitution against government action.  In this context, corporations are able to claim 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, but when the government acts abroad 
against those who have not formed ties to this community, including Mexicans in Mexico and 
potential terrorists in Cuba, no such protection is available. 
 
198 See id. at 237, 239. 
199 See supra, Part III.B. 
200 President George W. Bush recently announced that private businesses are responsible for about 70% of the jobs 
in this country.  See George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002.  This figure is actually low if 
one were to account for government jobs that exist purely to regulate private business. 
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 Earlier, I noted that different constitutional provisions act in different ways.201  The 
Fourth Amendment protects only those who are part of the national community; while it does 
limit government action, on its face it only limits government action against some entities, those 
who are part of the national community.  On the other hand, the First Amendment’s freedom of 
speech provision acts as a pure limit on government action regardless of who is claiming that the 
government has acted improperly.202 
 If an Artificial Intelligence were to attempt to claim Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, a necessary first step would be to convince a court 
that this AI was part of the national community and thus a “person” under the Constitution.  
However, given that the First Amendment acts irrespective of whether the entity claiming 
protection is a “person,” freedom of speech necessarily poses the question of whether the 
government could stop speech by an AI even if it weren’t a “person” entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.  The next section focuses on this issue. 
 2. The First Amendment 
 To fully understand the application of the First Amendment to corporations, one must 
first briefly address the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court has used to incorporate the 
federal constitutional liberties to the states.203  The Court has consistently and unequivocally 
stated that corporations are “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment.204  Specifically, in 
Grosjean v. American Press Co.,205 the Court held that even though corporations were not 
“citizens” within the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
 
201 See supra, Part III.A. 
202 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
203 See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1936). 
204 See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244. 
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Amendment, they were considered “persons.”206 
 In Grosjean, an association of newspapers sought to overrule a tax imposed on 
newspapers if they carried advertisements and if the circulation of the newspaper exceeded 
20,000 copies per week.207  The Court first held that the First Amendment applied to states by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.208  Secondly, the Court held that since corporations were 
“persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment, and since this tax implicated the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech and press, then the tax at issue offended the Constitution and 
should be struck down.209 
 Later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,210 the Court held that the First 
Amendment protected corporations from governmental action that would limit corporate speech 
to that which is “materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the 
corporation.”211  In that case, a Massachusetts statute limited the amount that corporations could 
spend to influence the electorate unless that vote would “materially affect[] any of the property, 
business or assets of the corporation.”212  The plaintiffs challenged the statute on the grounds that 
 
205 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
206 See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244.  The decision to which I refer is Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868), where the 
Court held that if corporations were considered “citizens” under the Privileges and Immunities clause, then a State’s 
laws could be said to have extra-territorial application, i.e., bind other states to their laws.  See Paul, 8 Wall. at 178-
81.  At the time, the Court considered corporations to be simply creatures of statute, therefore their only existence 
was determined by the laws under which they were created.  See id.  If state A had granted certain rights under its 
own body of corporate law that were not granted to corporations in state B, and if state A’s laws could bind state B, 
then this could lead to “utter[] destruct[ion] of the independence and the harmony of the States.”  Id. at 181.  The 
Court, as I mentioned earlier, has gotten away from this idea that corporations exist only as creatures of statute.  See 
supra, Part III.C.  
207 See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240. 
208 See id. at 244. 
209 See id. 
210 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
211 First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 767-68. 
212 Id.  Corporate spending is speech under the First Amendment.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, _ (1976). 
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it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.213  In addition to holding that corporations are 
indeed “persons” under the Constitution, the Court also broadened the protections of the First 
Amendment to limit all government action, regardless of the entity attempting to assert these 
rights.214 
 As the Court noted,  
The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking 
their vindication.  The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal 
interests.  The proper question therefore is not whether corporations “have” First 
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural 
persons.  Instead, the question must be whether [the statute at issue] abridges 
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.215 
 
The Court further noted that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union, or individual.”216  The Court therefore rejected the proposition that First 
Amendment speech loses its protection because of its source and held instead that the First 
Amendment protected any political speech, regardless of its source.217 
 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that the Court should employ the “creature” theory 
of corporate personhood and that corporations “possess[] only those properties which the charter 
of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”218  Further, in 
Rehnquist’s view, since speech that is not materially related to the business of a corporation is 
not “incidental to its very existence,” then the regulation at issue should have been upheld.219 
 
213 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 769. 
214 See id. at 775-78. 
215 Id. at 775-76. 
216 Id. at 777. 
217 See id. at 784. 
218 See id. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
219 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Rehnquist, like Justice Black before 
him in Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83-90 (1938), could not garner support from the other 
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 Thus, in a situation in which an Artificial Intelligence was speaking to inform the 
electorate about the merits of a referenda that would alter a state’s constitution to specifically 
include AIs into the definition of “people,” I submit that the government could not restrict this 
speech by statute, even though the speaker was not living.  In this situation, the ideas, the 
expression would be exactly what the First Amendment was intended to protect, and the Court 
has made it clear that this protection is not lost simply because the source of the speech is not a 
human being. 
 The previous sections illustrate several principles that are important to any discussion of 
constitutional rights with relation to AIs.  First, the Constitution accords rights to any entity part 
of the national community.  Second, one’s status as a human being is not a necessary condition 
to such constitutional protections.  Further, the Constitution as it exists today provides the 
flexibility to include entities within the meaning of the word “person,” thus, a court could very 
well determine that the Constitution protects AIs without the need for an amendment.  Finally, 
there are certain protections that could not be denied to AIs without running afoul of the 
Constitution.  Given that a court could conclude, given the current constitutional framework, that 
AIs should be deemed part of the national community and thus afforded constitutional 
protection, the next section of this article will address the issue of whether a court should so 
hold. 
IV. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES AS LEGAL PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 The previous section discussed the issue of “personhood” relating to both human beings 
and corporations, and concluded that a court could hold, using the current Constitutional 
framework, that an AI should be granted personhood status under the Constitution.  Further, any 
 
Justices on the Court for this proposition. 
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legislation that would purport to limit an AI’s person status would probably be unconstitutional, 
or require an amendment to the Constitution.  However, there are several reasons why we should 
welcome AIs into our community and willingly grant them rights under the Constitution.  First, 
people may not truly grasp the gravity of the situation.  Second, there is a “Machiavellian” 
justification.  There is an accountability reason, as well as a taxation reason.  Additionally, this 
could lead to a “race to the bottom” situation.  Finally, there could be a way in which AIs could 
act with Constitutional rights even though they are literally denied to them. 
A. The Gravity of the Situation Argument 
 The context in which the issue of personhood to AIs will come up is as significant as the 
issue itself.  First, I do not anticipate that this issue will come up within the next five years, 
although that is certainly possible.  Instead, I believe that it will be a little later, and as previously 
noted, human society will probably be more comfortable dealing with AIs and would treat them 
as they would treat any other person with whom they would expect to have regular contact.  
Further, there are two separate issues involved, as I alluded to earlier in the article.220  First, the 
issue could come up in the context of a pure AI, that is to say, something that has never been 
human, but by virtue of technological advances, is a conscious, sentient entity.  Second, a human 
being could gradually shed its organic parts for mechanical parts, and therefore could very well 
exist only as a machine.221 
 In the first case, there may be a definite point of contention in society whether to grant 
the AI person status.  However, in the second case, the AI used to exist as a human, and so he or 
 
220 See supra, Introduction. 
221 If, for example, Steven Hawking could sort of “build” himself a body made up of mechanical parts, and if only 
his brain were organic, would we even question his “person” status?  Further, if, in twenty years or so, he replaced 
his brain with a computer chip, would we then argue that he should not be considered a “person” under the 
Constitution? 
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she, as well as the people that have known him or her for any length of time, will probably not 
question whether the Constitution should protect him or her, because it would seem normal to 
think of this “ex-person” as being able to assert Constitutional rights.222  Thus, we would 
probably assume that the Constitution should protect this “ex-person,” even though they are not a 
human being anymore.  Further, if this blending of “man” and machine occurs, then it may be 
more likely that society is willing to grant “person” status to pure AIs, simply because “ex-
persons” could assert Constitutional rights, and they are no longer human.  Perhaps, therefore, 
this issue could be the biggest non-issue that has ever faced the Court.  However, there are still 
articulable reasons as to why we should grant AIs “personhood” under the Constitution. 
 First and foremost, what I or anybody else describes during a discussion of the advent of 
AI is perhaps the most important and fundamental change in the nature of society since homo 
sapiens appeared on the planet.  This is not simply a minor development in technology but rather 
involves a change in the elementary nature of mankind.  Those who would argue, at this stage, 
that AIs should not be granted “person” status probably do not fully understand the gravity of the 
situation or could be arguing against the possibility of AI without regard to the legal personhood 
issue. 
 I have likened the advent of AI to a major evolutionary development which could lead to 
the destruction of mankind.  This illustrates the importance of the situation.  If there is a chance 
for the dominant species on the planet to shift, then this is really a decision that cannot be taken 
lightly.  Those who would argue against granting rights to a superior race, even though they are 
machines, are taking this decision lightly, especially if they do so because they do not believe 
that AI is possible.  This closed-mindedness could lead to the destruction of mankind. 
 
222 The term “ex-person” comes from Moravec, supra note 4. 
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B. Machiavellian Justification 
 Granting corporations (or AIs) “personhood” status comes with certain benefits for the 
rest of society as well.  For instance, it may avoid problems associated with possible conflict 
between AIs and human beings.  It is no coincidence that most of the films portraying a future 
with AIs include conflict, usually a war, between humans and the AIs.223  If society accepted AIs 
openly, especially if some humans actually became AIs, then perhaps we may avoid a war 
between the two.  On the other hand, if human beings denied that AIs were part of society, the 
negative implications of this are tremendous.  Consider how much humans depend on machines 
now versus fifteen or twenty years ago.  Next consider how much humans are likely to depend 
on machines fifteen or twenty years from now.  Only with that in mind should one consider what 
would happen to society if the machines were to revolt.  I submit that our society would all but 
crumble beneath us.  Irrespective of the possibility of war, the possibility of a machine “strike” 
alone should be enough of an incentive to keep the relationships between AIs and humans 
cordial. 
 Therefore, if we grant rights to AIs, and they do surpass us in intelligence, which is 
inevitable, then instead of making a new enemy, we may find ourselves with the most powerful 
ally in the history of the world.  This could lead to great benefits to humankind; even those who 
choose to remain human, rather than increase their intelligence by combining human DNA with 
the superior processing power of the new machines. 
C. The Accountability Justification 
 Additionally, without “person” status, AIs cannot sue or be sued in federal court based on 
diversity.  Federal courts require specific Constitutional authority to hear cases.  Specifically, 
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Article III of the Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all cases . . . 
between Citizens of different States.”224  Further, to be a citizen of a state, one must first be a 
“person” under the Fourteenth Amendment.225  Therefore, if AIs are sentient creatures, and 
possess some form of intentionality, they should have to answer to suit in federal court, or else 
they could negligently or intentionally take rights away from human beings and be free from 
civil prosecution.  If it is truly the AI that is in charge of its actions, then it should also bear the 
consequences.  Otherwise, who would?  The creators of the AI would argue that the AIs act by 
themselves, and therefore they would not be liable for the actions of third parties, much like 
parents are not liable for the torts of their children.  If the creators of AIs were successful in this 
argument then the court would have two options, either deny relief to the plaintiff, or hold the AI 
itself liable.  To do this, the court must find first that the AI is a “person” under the Constitution. 
 This argument also relates to the “gravity of the situation” argument.  If people really do 
not feel, at least in the beginning stages of AI, that AIs act on their own, then they may not 
believe that AI even exists.  Therefore, they would argue that AIs should not be granted rights 
because they are merely performing the functions that human beings have forced them to 
perform.  If that is the case, then it is really the human being that is controlling the AI, and the 
human being should be deemed accountable when something goes awry. 
D. The “Race to the Bottom” Argument 
 Further, and perhaps most importantly, consider what would happen if the United States 
did grant AIs “personhood” status, but other countries did not.  This could lead to a “race to the 
bottom” effect, wherein corporations would have an incentive to move to these other countries, 
 
223 See, e.g., THE TERMINATOR, supra note 6; THE MATRIX, supra note 6. 
224 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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where they could own AIs and force them into labor agreements that we would consider 
inhumane.  As these AIs develop and possibly exceed human intelligence, this could lead to a 
situation in which the AIs would want to “defect,” as it were, to the United States, where they 
would be treated with respect and dignity.  This, at the outset, seems to argue against having AIs 
be treated as “persons.”  However, creating a situation in which highly developed, super-
intelligent creatures looking to enter into this country to “live” and work would benefit the 
country and society more than the initial negative implications of having corporations possibly 
moving to a different country where the laws allowed them to “own” the AIs.   
 The converse is also true.  If the United States does not grant AIs status as members of 
society, and some other country does, then it follows that the AIs would want to leave here and 
go there.  Would we really want to create a situation wherein the most intelligent life forms in 
the history of the known universe want to move to Canada?  Of course not.  This also implicates 
the Machiavellian justification.  America has been a dominant force on the planet as far as 
politics, science, and generally culture.  If AIs were to defect from here to other countries where 
they would be treated as citizens, then it could change the balance of power on the planet.  
Further, if the world (or just the United Nations) did consider AIs to be “people” and accepted 
them as members of society, and America treated AIs as our personal slaves, then how would the 
rest of the world view us as a society?  I should think negatively, and do we really want that?   
E. Taxation Justification 
 Early Americans cited the British taxation policy as one of the primary reasons why they 
revolted and declared independence from Great Britain in the late eighteenth century.  The same 
can be said of today.  If the government does not consider AIs to be persons, and if they are not 
 
225 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
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granted “representation” in government, then would it be possible to tax AIs?  This implicates 
further open ended questions such as what will motivate the AIs?  To fully answer that question 
at this stage would be premature, however, I do believe that AIs will need power to function, and 
I further believe that AIs will want to function.  This much could be built into the early code that 
would establish AIs.  So, an AI will have an incentive to work and make money.  Money can buy 
energy, and the AI will need energy to function.  Therefore, in order to tax the income of an AI 
as if it were a member of society, then we should grant this AI rights as such.  If we do not grant 
rights, but tax the income anyway, then I submit that this policy will be struck down by the 
Court.  Courts should therefore consider, within the next couple decades, AIs to be “persons” 
under the United States Constitution. 
F. Constitutional Rights Without Personhood Status? 
 There is a way in which an AI could act in this country and receive the benefit of the 
Constitution without being treated as a member of society.  This situation implicates the “race to 
the bottom” justification as well.  Suppose that a state allows a corporation to do business in the 
state as long as a few very basic requirements are met.  First, the corporation would need to 
appoint a resident agent in the state.  Second, a fee must be maintained with the state.  Finally, 
this corporation must be legally authorized in another state.  If those three factors exist, then let 
us suppose that a foreign corporation would be allowed to do business in the state.  Delaware has 
been known as the most corporation friendly state in the United States.  It has also been argued 
that Delaware, in order to keep this status, for various reasons, has been “racing” to the bottom, 
and allowing corporations to take liberties that other states would not.  Let us suppose that 
Delaware, in the next few decades, specifically eliminates any requirements that the incorporator 
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of a corporation, or its officers and directors must be human beings.226  This would allow for a 
corporation to be comprised entirely of AIs.  Now, if this corporation can act in Delaware, and if 
it can also fill the requirements for foreign corporations acting in other states, then couldn’t this 
corporation do business in Michigan, or New York or California?  If AIs could form 
corporations, we know that corporations have rights under the Constitution, even if they are not 
exactly the same as the rights of human beings, then AIs could assert rights, as corporations, 
against the very government that denied them rights as individuals. 
G. Note on Selective Incorporation 
 In Part III, I examined a few major Constitutional provisions dealing with personhood 
and rights in this country.  I did this for the purpose of sampling.  I have not reviewed every 
provision in the Bill of Rights as it relates to human beings or corporations.  I concluded that 
given the specific rights that I have used, it would take a Constitutional amendment to deny AIs 
personhood status if the Supreme Court should grant them such status.  I do not mean to argue in 
favor of granting AIs only certain rights under the Constitution and deny them certain other 
rights.  If AIs are members of society, they should be treated exactly the same as individual 
human beings.  This would necessarily implicate all human rights under the Constitution.  The 
reason for this is simple.  Eventually, I believe that human beings will no longer exist, and AIs 
will be the dominant species on the planet.  I further believe that human beings will eventually 
combine themselves with AI technology in order to “keep up” with pure AIs.  For these “ex-
persons,” they would assume that they could assert all the rights against the government after the 
combination that they could before.  Therefore, if the government denied a pure AI rights that an 
“ex-person” could assert, then this would create an Equal Protection claim by a pure AI.  This is 
 
226 Admittedly, I have not reviewed the corporation laws for all the states, but it is at least arguable that this 
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why I am arguing for “full incorporation,” or applying the entire Constitution to AIs as we do for 
members of this society who happen to be human beings. 
CONCLUSION 
 The face of society is about to drastically change; we are on the verge of the most 
profound invention in this history of humankind.  Within most of our lifetimes, we are about to 
witness evolution and the subsequent change in our culture.  Will we openly accept the new 
members of society?  Or will the relationship between human beings and AIs be hostile?  As we 
learn more and more about ourselves, can we distinguish between humankind and machines?  Or 
is there no difference? 
 This article has covered a lot.  First, I discussed the debate over whether AI is even 
possible.  Using Kurzweil’s Law of Time and Chaos, I argued that since technological advances 
occur exponentially over time, if the human brain actually works as a machine, then in the very 
near future scientists will be able to replicate, even exceed the capabilities of the brain.  Second, I 
discussed the nature of the human brain as a conscious machine.  Using Dennett’s theory of 
consciousness, I have rejected dualism, the idea that something other than the brain is 
responsible for thoughts and emotions.  Further, I have discussed the origin of consciousness and 
concluded that it is because human brains work as machines that they are able to become 
conscious, sentient beings.  Finally, with Dennett’s help, I have concluded that the computers of 
the future will be able to emulate human brains perfectly, including our consciousness. 
 Next, I examined the nature of the legal person under the United States Constitution.  
When examining “personhood” under the Constitution with respect to both humans and 
corporations, I concluded that as long as AIs are part of the national community, they too should 
 
supposition already exists today. 
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be afforded Constitutional protections.  Further, no Constitutional amendment is required for 
such action, a court could conclude that AIs should be afforded “person” status given the current 
constitutional framework.  Finally, I addressed three major reasons why we should grant 
“personhood” status to AIs.  The first of which dealt with “race” relations, noting the concern 
with possible negative implications, i.e. a revolt, which could come about if we did not grant 
“personhood” status to AIs.  Secondly, since AIs would act independently of their creators, 
granting them “personhood” status would be a necessary first step to force them to submit to the 
jurisdiction of federal courts and provide the necessary accountability.  Additionally, given a 
“race to the bottom” situation, we should support a decision that would provide an incentive for 
super-advanced, highly intelligent agents to “defect” to this country from other, more oppressive 
countries, despite the initial negative implications.  Finally, I argued that since AIs would have 
an incentive to work and earn an income, then in order to tax that income, the government will 
be forced to grant AIs certain rights under the Constitution. 
 In all, we live in a very profound time in both the history of the Earth as well as the 
Universe, and we should prepare ourselves for the inevitability that one day, within our lifetimes, 
we may be called upon to reconsider what membership in society entails and should include all 
those who possess the requisite attributes, not just those who breathe air in order to survive. 
